The debate about the nature of modernity and postmodernity has become central to intellectual culture today. In this work, two distinguished social theorists make a distinctive contribution to this continuing discussion.

Appraisal theories of emotion have two fundamental assumptions: (a) that there are regularities to be discovered between situations and components of emotional episodes, and (b) that the influence of these situations on these components is causally mediated by a mental process called appraisal. Appraisal theories come in different flavors, proposing different to-be-explained phenomena and different underlying mechanisms for the influence of appraisal on the other components.

This radical analysis of the role and importance of historiography interprets the philosophy and theory of history on the basis of historicity as a human condition. The book examins the norms and methods of historiography from a philosophical point of view, but rejects generalisations tht the philosophy of history can provide all the answers to contemporary problems. Instead it outlines a feasible theory of history which is still radical enough to apply to all social structures.

A recent review of his work describes Wilfred Carr as 'one of the most brilliant philosophers now working in the rich British tradition of educational philosophy ... His work is rigorous, refreshing and original ... and examines a number of fundamental issues with clarity and penetration'. In For Education Wilfred Carr provides a comprehensive justification for reconstructing educational theory and research as a form of critical inquiry. In doing this, he confronts a number of important philosophical questions. What (...) is educational theory? What is an educational practice? How are theory and practice related? What is the role of values in educational research? Is a genuinely educational science possible? By appealing to developments in critical theory, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of the social sciences, Wilfred Carr provides answers to these questions which vindicate the idea of an educational science that is not 'on' or 'about' education but 'for education' - a science genuinely committed to promoting educational values and ideals. (shrink)

Aspiration by Agnes Callard locates standing assumptions in the theory of rationality, moral psychology and autonomy that preclude the possibility of working to acquire new values. The book also explains what changes need to be made if we are to make room for this form of agency, which I call aspiration.

In this paper, I characterize visual epistemic representations as concrete two- or three-dimensional tools for conveying information about aspects of their target systems or phenomena of interest. I outline two features of successful visual epistemic representation: that the vehicle of representation contain sufficiently accurate information about the phenomenon of interest for the user’s purpose, and that it convey this information to the user in a manner that makes it readily available to her. I argue that actual epistemic representation may involve (...) tradeoffs between these and is successful to the extent that they are present. (shrink)

Objections to the use of historical case studies for philosophical ends fall into two categories. Methodological objections claim that historical accounts and their uses by philosophers are subject to various biases. We argue that these challenges are not special; they also apply to other epistemic practices. Metaphysical objections, on the other hand, claim that historical case studies are intrinsically unsuited to serve as evidence for philosophical claims, even when carefully constructed and used, and so constitute a distinct class of challenge. (...) We show that attention to what makes for a canonical case can address these problems. A case study is canonical with respect to a particular philosophical aim when the features relevant to that aim provide a reasonably complete causal account of the results of the historical process under investigation. We show how to establish canonicity by evaluating relevant contingencies using two prominent examples from the history of science: Eddington’s confirmation of Einstein’s theory of general relativity using his data from the 1919 eclipse and Watson and Crick’s determination of the structure of DNA. (shrink)

The modal logician's notion of possible world and the computer scientist's notion of state of a machine provide a point of commonality which can form the foundation of a logic of action. Extending ordinary modal logic with the calculus of binary relations leads to a very natural logic for describing the behavior of computer programs.

In this paper, I take scientific models to be epistemic representations of their target systems. I define an epistemic representation to be a tool for gaining information about its target system and argue that a vehicle’s capacity to provide specific information about its target system—its informativeness—is an essential feature of this kind of representation. I draw an analogy to our ordinary notion of interpretation to show that a user’s aim of faithfully representing the target system is necessary for securing this (...) feature. (shrink)

It is shown that the many-dimensional modal logic K n , determined by products of n-many Kripke frames, is not finitely axiomatisable in the n-modal language, for any $n > 2$ . On the other hand, K n is determined by a class of frames satisfying a single first-order sentence.

INTRODUCTION Is there a * Renaissance ideal of man'? The consciousness that man is a historical being is a product of bourgeois development ; the condition ...

On doit sans doute admettre que le discours de l’évaluation vient de l’intérêt de quelques hommes pour la production et son contrôle. Ce sont eux qui ont facilité l’implantation du discours de la science dans l’industrie un peu avant et un peu après la Seconde Guerre mondiale.C’est aux États-Unis, dans les années 1930, que Walter Shewhart2 et trois autres scientifiques américains3..

The scientific developments of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have traditionally been associated with the revival of Platonism. The natural philosophers who invented the methods of classical physics have usually been depicted as men who repudiated the principles of Aristotle and embraced conceptions provided by the writings of Plato and his school. The characteristic feature derived from Platonism was the emphasis on mathematics and it is with the application of mathematics to experience, under specially devised conditions, that modern science arose. (...) In this sense, it is the Piatonism of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo, which forms the distinctive quality of the scientific revolution that culminates in the work of Newton. (shrink)

Poets, like other men, have their speculative moods. Some poets have been widely read in the literature of philosophy and have wrestled continuously with the intellectual problems of their times. From Euripides to Mr. Eliot large expanses of dialectical argument have appeared in verse, and in our own tongue Spenser, Shakespeare, Pope, Wordsworth and many other supreme writers have questioned the semblance of nature and mind, and have sought to trace the ideal forms of reality. Men of letters in every (...) generation have naturally discussed the problems of knowledge and existence and have offered emphatic opinions on them. The views of poets have been accorded particular honour and attention. Illustrious poets have declared that poetry opens a more penetrating road to truth than that which is provided by science or academic philosophy. Certain modern critics repeat these claims. “The mind of man,” writes one, “has a knowledge of truth beyond the near-truths of science and society. Poetry tells us this truth.” I will not pause here to inquire whether anything of value can be observed of poetry in general any more than can be stated of prose in general. Nor do I wish to enter into the subject of poetic truth. The questions I desire to raise concern assumptions about the philosophical ideas of poets. Recent criticism has shown a notable tendency to fasten on these ideas. The tendency revives the practice of the nineteenth century when theologians, philosophers and literary thinkers were fond of expounding the rational systems of Wordsworth, Tennyson and Browning. The present vogue of this prosaic treatment of poetry may be due to a strong recoil from the literary fashion prevalent a generation ago which minimized the intellectual feature in the art of poetry. (shrink)

Among the manifold tendencies that contributed to the philosophical revolution of the seventeenth century was a revival of Greek atomism. The ancient particulate theories of nature had been rediscovered by way of Lucretius and Diogenes Laertius in the fifteenth century and later scholars explored the principles of Democritus and Epicurus.

Standard dual-process models in the action domain postulate that stimulus-driven processes are responsible for suboptimal behavior because they take them to be rigid and automatic and therefore the default. We propose an alternative dual-process model in which goal-directed processes are the default instead. We then transfer the dual- process logic from the action domain to the emotion domain. This reveals that emotional behavior is often attributed to stimulus-driven processes. Our alternative model submits that goal-directed processes could be the primary determinant (...) of emotional behavior instead. We evaluate the type of empirical evidence required for validating our model and we consider implications of our model for behavior change, encouraging strategies focused on the expectancies and values of action outcomes. (shrink)

Many appraisal theories claim that appraisal causes emotion. Critics have rejected this claim because they believe (a) it is incompatible with the claim that appraisal is a part of emotion, (b) it is not empirically supported, (c) it is circular and hence nonempirical, and (d) there are alternative causes. I reply that (a) the causal claim is incompatible with the part claim on some but not all interpretations of the causal claim and the part claim, (b) the lack of empirical (...) support can be remedied, (c) there may even be ways to cope with the circularity problem, and (d) it is unclear to what extent the alternative causes differ from appraisal. (shrink)

The value of Colin Wilson as an original philosopher - and more.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Leviathan after 350 YearsSharon VaughanTom Sorell and Luc Foisneau, editors. Leviathan after 350 Years. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. Pp. x + 308. Cloth, $74.00The editors introduce this collection as a testament to the continuing importance of Leviathan in political thought. Divided into three parts, these twelve essays are some of the papers presented at a May 2001 conference to mark the 350th anniversary of Leviathan's publication. Readers might (...) expect a discussion about Leviathan's endurance and relevance as a fundamental text of political philosophy, but this is not the book's main thrust. Instead, the authors engage in a discussion concerning some of the most provocative and controversial questions about Leviathan. Much of the debate centers on how one should interpret it, forcing readers not only to reconsider crucial parts of Hobbes's philosophy, but also the act of interpretation.Part one examines the place that Leviathan holds among Hobbes's political writings. Karl Schumann argues that one should not think of Leviathan as a radical departure from De Cive and that it did not mark the culmination of Hobbes's development as a political philosopher (14). Schumann's essay is not convincing because he effectively points out the consequential ways that Leviathan is distinct. Ted H. Miller suggests, "Leviathan's uniqueness is rooted in its poetic-philosophical innovations"(103). He points out that David Johnston, Quentin Skinner, and others have stressed the significance of its rhetorical style. Miller, however, proposes that it was the context and the company that Hobbes kept during this time that influenced his writing style. Kinch Hoekstra suggests that Hobbes is an unusual de facto theorist and Luc Foisneau believes that Leviathan is unique because of its theory of justice.Part two is devoted to investigating passions and politics in Leviathan. Richard Tuck believes that Hobbes's political philosophy is utopian because it demands a radical transformation of humans as passionate beings. Tuck says that while the Leviathan provides citizens with security, "they are also going to live a life without pride, their sense of their own individual importance reduced to nothing in the face of their commonwealth" (138). Tuck's essay stands in contrast to Tom Sorrell's analysis of the burdens on the sovereign. He concludes that he must be an individual with little, if any, regard for his own ambitions and passions (196). What one is left with is a Hobbesian version of a philosopher king who has his personal appetites in check always looking out for what benefits his subjects. Is [End Page 210] there any guarantee that the sovereign will be non-egotistical and public-spirited? No, because the sovereign has absolute freedom. Sorrell believes, however, that it is in the sovereign's best interest to be unselfish if she is to maintain her sovereignty (193).Quentin Skinner analyzes the classical theory of laughter, relating it to Hobbes's complicated views about it. Political agency in Leviathan is Yves Zarka's topic. It seems that the citizen is merely a subject, but Zarka cautions that one must carefully read the text and remember that certain rights are inalienable. How far one may take what Zarka interprets as the "the right of resistance" remains a debatable question (182). He believes that one might rethink Leviathan as a more complex piece of political philosophy by practicing "back-to front reading" as opposed to a direct-method reading of the text (182). Zarka thinks that citizens may have a more complex and passionate role than commonly thought (182). This is an alluring suggestion, but it is difficult to accept in light of Hobbes's preoccupation with security and obedience.The role of biblical and political authority is the theme for part three. Edwin Curley argues that Hobbes's treatment of covenants with God was possibly a vehicle for him to arouse skepticism about Christianity among his readers. A. P. Martinich rejects Curley's claim and concludes that not only does his argument fail on grounds of logic, but also it requires far too much "reading between the lines" (223). Martinich's analytic rigor and his attention to the process of interpretation raise serious doubts about Curley... (shrink)

I present an overview of emotion theories, organised around the question of emotion causation. I argue that theories of emotion causation should ideally address the problems of elicitation, intensity, and differentiation. Each of these problems can be divided into a subquestion that asks about the relation between stimuli and emotions (i.e., the functional level of process description, cf. Marr, 1982) and a subquestion that asks about the mechanism and representations that intervene (i.e., the algorithmic level of process description). The overview (...) reveals that theories of emotion causation sometimes differ with regard to the kind of process that they hold responsible for emotion causation. More precisely, they hold different assumptions regarding the conditions under which the process is supposed to operate (optimal versus suboptimal), the format of the representations involved (propositional versus perceptual), and the object or input of the central process (stimulus versus responses/experience). Further, the overview reveals that theories of emotion causation sometimes differ with regard to the level of process description that they focus on. Finally, the overview brings to light several similarities among the theories discussed. (shrink)

A lively debate in the literature on moral progress concerns the role of practical reasoning: Does it enable or subvert moral progress? Rationalists believe that moral reasoning enables moral progress, because it helps enhance objectivity in thinking, overcome unruly sentiments, and open our minds to new possibilities. By contrast, skeptics argue that moral reasoning subverts moral progress. Citing growing empirical research on bias, they show that objectivity is an illusion and that moral reasoning merely rationalizes pre-existing biased moral norms. In (...) this article, I argue that both the rationalists and the skeptics fail to understand fully the role of practical reasoning by focusing exclusively on moral reasoning to the neglect of social reasoning. In the first half of the article, I argue against the skeptics by vindicating moral reasoning. I identify a Democratic Model of moral reasoning which is reliable and effective in overcoming bias. In the second part of the article, I argue against the rationalists. Drawing on a paradigmatic case of moral progress, i.e., the British abolition of the slave trade, I illustrate that moral reasoning, even when sound, is insufficient to motivate progressive action. The explanation for this puzzling phenomenon is not that the moral norm against cruelty is inert, as skeptics might suggest. Rather, it is that the moral norm against cruelty was overridden by the social norm of slavery which was tied to the British joint commitments to freedom and national honour. The debate between rationalists and skeptics centers around the moral rationality of human action, failing to recognize that human action is in fact primarily about social rationality. I defend a joint commitment account of social rationality, and offer a novel Communitarian Model of social reasoning which follows the logic of social rationality to revise social norms. I defend the reliability and efficacy of the Communitarian Model of social reasoning by applying it to the abolitionist social movement to show how Britons gave fellow Britons social reasons grounded in their joint commitments to freedom and national honour to end slavery. (shrink)